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Abstract  — In the database outsourcing paradigm, a data 
owner (DO) delegates its DBMS administration to a specialized 
service provider (SP) that receives and processes queries from 
clients. The traditional outsourcing model (TOM) requires that 
the  DO and the SP maintain authenticated data structures to 
enable authentication of query results. In this paper, we present 
SAE, a novel outsourcing model that separates authentication 
from query execution. Specifically, the DO does not perform any 
task except for maintaining its dataset (if there are updates). The 
SP only stores the DO's dataset and computes the query results 
using a conventional DBMS. All security-related tasks are 
outsourced to a separate trusted entity ( TE), which maintains 
limited authentication information about the original dataset. A 
client contacts the TE when it wishes to establish the correctness 
of a result returned by the SP. The TE efficiently generates a 
verification token of negligible size. The client can verify the 
token with minimal cost. SAE eliminates the participation of the 
DO and the SP in the authentication process, and outperforms 
TOM in every aspect, including processing cost for all parties 
involved, communication overhead, query response time and 
ease of implementation in practical applications. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Instead of administrating their data locally, several 
organizations  outsource DBMS management to third-party 
service providers that receive and process queries from clients. 
The providers are not necessarily trustworthy and, thus, they 
should be able to prove that the results are sound (i.e., 
unaltered and containing no bogus data) and complete (i.e., all 
records satisfying the query are present). We refer to a sound 
and complete query result as correct. Figure 1 illustrates the 
traditional outsourcing model (TOM). The data owner (DO) 
builds an authenticated data structure (ADS) over its dataset. 
The ADS is a conventional index, augmented with hash values 
or signatures generated with a public-key cryptosystem (e.g., 
RSA). The DO transmits its dataset and signatures to the 
service provider (SP), which constructs the ADS locally and 
utilizes it to compute the result of each incoming query, as 
well as a verification object ( VO). The VO contains 
authentication data (i.e., hashes/signatures) for proving the 
correctness of the query result. In case of updates, the DO 
generates new signatures, modifies its ADS, and notifies the 
SP that updates its ADS accordingly.  
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Fig. 1 The traditional database outsourcing model 
Several  ADS have been proposed for range query 
authentication [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11]. The current state-of-
the-art for disk-based datasets is the MB-Tree [5], which 
combines the concepts of the B
+-Tree and the Merkle Hash 
Tree [7]. A leaf node entry in the MB-tree is associated with a 
digest computed on the binary representation of the 
corresponding record, using a one-way,  collision-resistant 
hash function. An intermediate node entry is associated with a 
digest computed on the concatenation of the digests in the 
page it points to. The DO signs the digest hroot associated with 
the root. The DO and the SP maintain identical copies of the 
MB-tree and the signature. Assume a 1D range query q 
corresponding to the result RS = {ri, ri+1,…, rj}. In addition to 
RS, the SP returns to the client a VO that contains: (i) the two 
boundary records ri-1, rj+1 that enclose RS, (ii) the digests of 
all left siblings of every visited entry in the path from the root 
to ri-1, (iii) the digests of all right siblings of every visited 
entry in the path from the root to rj+1, and (iv) the DO's 
signature.  The client can re-construct hroot from RS and the 
digests in the VO, and match it against the signature. 
Soundness is established by hash collision resistance. 
Completeness is guaranteed through the presence of the two 
boundary records.  
TOM suffers from several drawbacks: (i) the DO is actively 
involved in the framework, since it has to build and maintain 
an ADS locally, thus, defeating the purpose of outsourcing; (ii) 
the  SP must modify its DBMS in order to embed ADS 
functionality; (iii) the VO is typically large, imposing 
substantial communication overhead; (iv) the ADS exhibits 
inferior performance with respect to a conventional index. 
Motivated by these shortcomings, we propose SAE, a novel 
outsourcing model that offers a wide range of benefits. SAE 
separates authentication from query execution by exploiting 
trustworthy organizations with expertise on security issues. 
We henceforth refer to such an organization as a trusted entity 
(TE). Although a TE possesses up-to-date resources and know-how on security standards, cryptographic libraries, etc., 
it does not necessarily have the infrastructure to manage large 
databases and high query loads. Therefore, SAE assigns to the 
TE only the authentication process, which involves little 
computational effort compared to the actual query processing 
performed at the SP. Next, we present the main concepts of 
SAE, focusing on 1D range queries. 
II.  SAE 
Figure 2 outlines the basic functionality of SAE. The DO 
transmits a relational table R (to be outsourced) to the SP, 
which stores R in a conventional DBMS. The DO also sends 
the dataset to the TE. For each record ri∈R, the TE generates a 
tuple  ti = <ti.id,  ti.a,  ti.h>, where: (i) ti.id is the unique 
identifier of ri, (ii) ti.a is the value of the query attribute in ri 
(i.e., ri.a), and (iii) ti.h is computed by applying a (one-way, 
collision-resistant) hash function on the binary representation 
of  ri. For instance, suppose that the DO is a consumer 
electronics shop, and R is a relation of digital camera 
specifications that contains columns (id, manufacturer, model, 
price). Let price be the query attribute and rm = (15, "Canon", 
"SD850 IS", 250) be an arbitrary record in R. The SP stores 
the entire rm, whereas the TE keeps tm = (15, 250, hm), where 
hm is computed on the binary representation of rm, and 
discards the other attribute values (i.e., manufacturer, model). 
We denote the set of tuples t generated from the records in R 
as T.   
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Fig. 2 The entities and their interaction in SAE 
Clients issue queries directly to the SP, which sends back 
only the results. Let q be a range query on attribute a. RS = {ri, 
ri+1, …, rj}  ⊆  R signifies the actual result, and |RS| its 
cardinality. Continuing the above example, q could be "select 
all cameras from R whose price is between 200 and 300 
euros". Assume that after processing q, the SP returns a set 
RS
SP to the client, which may be different from the correct 
result RS, if the SP is malicious. In order to verify RS
SP, the 
client sends q to the TE
1. Let S⊕ be the exclusive-OR (XOR) 
of the digests of tuples in a set S. Upon receiving q, the TE 
first determines set TS = {ti, ti+1, …, tj} ⊆ T, whose tuples 
correspond to the records of RS. It then produces a verification 
token  VT  = TS⊕ = ti.h  ⊕  ti+1.h  ⊕  …  ⊕  tj.h =  RS⊕, which 
captures authentication information about RS.  VT consumes 
just a few bytes (i.e., the size of a digest) independently of the 
                                                 
1  Query processing at the SP and VT generation at the TE are 
independent; therefore, the client sends the query to both the TE 
and the SP simultaneously, in order to reduce the response time. 
result size and, as we show in Section III, it can be computed 
very efficiently by utilizing auxiliary structures. The TE 
finally transmits the VT to the client.  
The client computes RSSP
⊕  (i.e., the XOR of the digests of 
the records in RS
SP) locally, and matches it against the VT. 
Assume that a malicious SP returns to the client a corrupt 
result RS
SP = (RS-DS) ∪ IS, where DS (⊆ RS) is a subset of the 
actual results and IS is a set of fake tuples. By removing DS 
from RS, the SP attacks the result completeness, whereas by 
injecting IS it attacks soundness. Note that modifying a tuple r 
∈ RS to r' is equivalent to including r into DS, and r' into IS. 
The SP can escape detection, if and only if the VT produced 
for RS (i.e., RS⊕) is equal to RSSP
⊕  . This happens if and only if: 
RS⊕ =  ((RS-DS)∪IS)⊕ ⇔ RS⊕ =  RS⊕⊕DS⊕⊕IS⊕ 
 ⇔ DS⊕ = IS⊕ 
In [9], we prove that it is computationally infeasible for the 
SP to find sets of records DS and IS such that DS⊕ = IS⊕; 
therefore, SAE is secure. Furthermore, compared to TOM, 
SAE has numerous advantages including the following:  
•  The  DO has a minimal participation, as it simply 
transmits its dataset (and updates, if any) to the SP and 
the  TE, without having to compute authentication 
information and maintain a sophisticated ADS locally.  
•  The  SP does not need specialized infrastructure. Since 
there is no overhead of authentication information, query 
processing is as fast as in conventional database systems. 
•  The transmission overhead is very small, because the size 
of the VT is negligible compared to that of typical VOs. 
Furthermore, the client can only verify the queries of its 
choice, whereas in TOM the authentication overhead 
occurs for all queries.  
III. XB-TREE 
Recall that the TE maintains a set T of tuples ti = <ti.id, ti.a, 
ti.h>, each corresponding to a record ri  ∈  R. In order to 
compute the VT for a query q, the TE could perform a 
sequential scan of T and retrieve the digests of all records 
qualifying q. Although the size of ti is usually much smaller 
than that of ri, this scan can be expensive contradicting the 
goal of SAE, which requires that the effort of the TE should 
be minimal compared to that of the SP. Towards this goal, we 
propose the XOR B-Tree (XB-Tree), a disk-based index that 
organizes XOR values. Each entry e of an intermediate node 
has the form <e.sk, e.L, e.X, e.c>
2, where: (i) e.sk is a search 
key, (ii) e.L is a pointer to a disk page containing the ids and 
digests of the tuples in T with a values equal to e.sk, (iii) e.X is 
a bit string, and (iv) e.c is a pointer to the child node of e. Let 
ei-1, ei be two successive entries in the same intermediate node. 
The sub-tree rooted at node ei.c (ei-1.c) contains entries whose 
search keys are larger (smaller) than ei.sk. ei.X is the XOR of 
the digests of the tuples in ei.L and the X values of the entries 
in ei.c. In other words, ei.X represents the XOR of the tuples 
                                                 
2 Except for the first entry e0 that has the form < e0.X, e0.c>. For leaf 
nodes, e0.X is 0 and e0.c is null. with search keys larger than or equal to ei.sk, and (strictly) less 
than ei+1.sk. Leaf entries are similar, except that their child 
pointers are null. Figure 3 outlines the features of an XB-Tree 
indexing tuples t1 - t14, with search keys {1, 3, 3, 6, 6, 12, 13, 
15, 18, 18, 20, 23, 23, 25}, respectively. For simplicity, we 
assume that the fanout is 3, but for typical disk page sizes, the 
number of entries per node is in the order of 100. For instance, 
in case of entry e4: (i) e4.sk = 6, (ii) e4.L points to the page that 
accommodates tuples {<t4.id,  t4.h>, <t5.id,  t5.h>}, (iii) e4.c 
points to node N5, (iv) e4.X is equal to e4.L⊕ ⊕ e11.X ⊕ e12.X = 
t4.h ⊕ t5.h ⊕ t6.h (e4.L⊕ denotes the XOR of the digests of the 
tuples in e4.L). Finally, observe that for the first entry e3 of 
node N2: e3.X = e8.X ⊕ e9.X ⊕ e10.X and e3.c = N4, but there 
are no e3.sk and e3.L attributes. 
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Fig. 3 XB-Tree example 
To produce the VT for a query q:[ql, qu], where ql (qu) is 
q's lower (upper) bound, the TE executes algorithm 
GenerateVT of Figure 4. The procedure is recursive and takes 
as initial arguments: q, the root node N of the XB-Tree, and 
bitstring VT=0. Note that VT is passed by reference. Let f be 
the number of entries in N. For simplicity, in the pseudo-code 
we assume that e0.sk = -∞ (although the XB-Tree does not 
store  e0.sk), and that there is a fictitious entry ef (also not 
existing in the tree) with ef.sk = +∞. The loop in lines 1-7 
scans the f entries of N, and distinguishes two cases in which 
it updates VT: (i) If ql is less than or equal to ei.sk, and qu is 
greater than or equal to ei+1.sk, then all the tuples in ei.L as 
well as in the subtree rooted at ei.c are present in the result. 
Therefore, GenerateVT XORes ei.X to VT (lines 2-3). (ii) If 
ei.sk is enclosed in q (but not the subtree pointed by ei.c), the 
algorithm sets VT to VT ⊕ ei.L⊕ (lines 4-5). Lines 6-8 simply 
ensure that the procedure recursively visits the nodes at deeper 
levels of the XB-Tree. 
GenerateVT (RangeQuery q, XBNode N, &VT) 
1.  For i = 0, 1, …, f – 1 
2.     If  (q.ql ≤ ei.sk) and (q.qu ≥ ei+1.sk) 
3.     VT = VT ⊕ ei.X 
4.     Else  if  (q.ql ≤ ei.sk) and (q.qu ≥ ei.sk)) 
5.       VT = VT ⊕ ei.L⊕  
6.     If  ((q.ql > ei.sk) and (q.ql < ei+1.sk)) or  
7.     ((q.qu > ei.sk) and (q.qu < ei+1.sk)) 
8.       If  (ei.c ≠ null), GenerateVT(q, ei.c, VT) 
Fig. 4 Algorithms for generating the VT 
We demonstrate GenerateVT with the example of Figure 3, 
for query q:[5, 17]. Upon the first procedure call, VT = 0 and 
N = N1. Since no search key in N1 or subtree rooted at an N1's 
entry is enclosed in q, the algorithm does not update VT, and 
recursively continues in N2. Because both e4.sk = 6 and e5.sk = 
13 lie in q, GenerateVT first computes VT = VT ⊕ e4.X = 0 ⊕ 
e4.L⊕ ⊕ e11.X ⊕ e12.X = t4.h ⊕ t5.h ⊕ t6.h (lines 2-3 in Figure 4) 
since, except for the records in e4.L, the tuples in the subtree 
rooted at e4.c (i.e., node N5) are contained in q as well . The 
algorithm next calculates VT = VT ⊕ e5.L⊕ = (t4.h ⊕ t5.h ⊕ t6.h) 
⊕ t7.h (lines 4-5), in order to include the digests of the tuples 
with search key 13 in VT. Subsequently, the procedure visits 
N4 and N6. Since ql > e10.sk = 3, GenerateVT does not perform 
any action in N4. On the other hand, in N6, it first updates VT 
to VT ⊕ e13.X = VT ⊕ 0 = t4.h ⊕ t5.h ⊕ t6.h ⊕ t7.h (lines 2-3), 
and then evaluates VT = VT ⊕ e14.L⊕ = (t4.h ⊕ t5.h ⊕ t6.h ⊕ 
t7.h) ⊕ t8.h (lines 4-5), because e14.sk = 15 satisfies q. The 
algorithm then terminates. Observe that the final VT, i.e., t4.h 
⊕ t5.h ⊕ t6.h ⊕ t7.h ⊕ t8.h, is the desired one, as it represents 
the XOR of the digests of the tuples in q's actual result. 
GenerateVT visits O(logfXBK) nodes independently of the 
query result size, where K is the number of tree nodes and fXB 
is the maximum fanout of the XB-Tree (some traversals may 
not reach the leaf level). Furthermore, the XB-Tree supports 
fast insertion and deletion operations in O(log fXBK) time, 
utilizing the standard insertion and deletion algorithms of the 
traditional B-Tree, subject to some modifications concerning 
the proper updating of the X values. Since the TE maintains 
only two attributes (search key, id) and a digest for each 
record, the size of T is small compared to the original dataset 
R, especially if R contains numerous or large (e.g., text, 
images) attributes.  
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We compare SAE with TOM using an Intel Core Duo 
2GHz, with 2GB of RAM. All cryptographic components are 
implemented with the Crypto++ library [1]. A digest 
consumes 20 bytes for both SAE and TOM. Each record 
contains a search key (i.e., a value on the range query attribute) 
and additional attributes. The search keys are integers (4 bytes) 
in the domain [0, 10
7]. The total record size is set to 500 bytes. 
We use two datasets: (i) UNF, where the search keys follow a 
uniform distribution, and (ii) SKW, where the keys are 
generated using ZIPF, with the skewness parameter set to 0.8 
(i.e., so that 77% of the search keys are concentrated in 20% 
of the domain). We evaluate the performance of SAE and 
TOM for different dataset cardinalities (n). For each 
experiment, we perform 100 uniform queries with extent 0.5% 
of the entire domain, and present the average cost over all 
measurements. In TOM, the SP indexes records with an MB-
Tree, while in SAE with a B
+-Tree. The TE (in SAE) uses an 
XB-Tree. All indexes are disk-based using pages of 4096 
bytes.  When measuring processing cost, we charge 10 milli-
seconds for each node access. 
Figure 5 illustrates the communication overhead between 
the pair (TE, client) in SAE and (SP, client) in TOM. This 
overhead refers only to the authentication information and 
excludes the cost of transmitting the result. In SAE, the only 
authentication information exchanged is the VT, which is 20 
bytes irrespectively of the cardinality of the result set. This 
overhead is negligible compared to the VO size in TOM, 
which is 2-3 orders of magnitude higher. TE-Client SAE SP-ClientTOM  
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Fig. 5 Communication overhead vs. n 
Figure 6 depicts the query processing overhead (in milli-
seconds) versus n. For SAE, we include the costs at the SP 
(for computing the result) and the TE (for producing the VT). 
TOM involves a higher cost at the SP because of the lower 
fanout of the MB-Tree compared to the B
+-Tree in SAE. In 
particular, SAE reduces the burden at the SP by 30%-39% in 
UNF, and 24%-37% in SKW. The computational effort at the 
TE is negligible because VT generation always involves two 
tree traversals. On the other hand, both the B
+-Tree and the 
MB-Tree entail two additional scans; (i) at the leaf level of the 
index, and (ii) in the dataset file for retrieving the results. 
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Fig. 6 Query processing time vs. n 
Figure 7 shows the verification cost as a function of the 
dataset cardinality. As n increases, more records satisfy the 
query, which has fixed extent. The verification cost is linearly 
dependent on the result size for both methods. In SAE the 
client has to compute a digest for each record received by the 
SP. In TOM, the client must also re-construct the root digest 
of the MB-Tree and verify it against the DO's signature. The 
verification times are lower for SKW, because the average 
result cardinality is smaller and, thus, the client computes 
fewer digests.  
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Fig. 7 Verification time vs. n 
Figure 8 evaluates SAE and TOM with respect to storage 
cost. Both methods require similar total space at the SP, 
because the consumption is dominated by the outsourced 
dataset (i.e., the additional authentication information is small 
compared to the actual records). Furthermore, recall that the 
TE maintains only the digest of each record. Therefore, its 
storage requirements are minor compared to that of the SP, 
implying that the TE can maintain a main memory index 
(instead of the disk-based XB-Tree). 
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Fig. 8 Storage cost vs. n 
To conclude, in addition to its other benefits, SAE also 
outperforms TOM in every performance metric. The most 
significant savings refer to (i) the network overhead, where 
the VT is up to 3 orders of magnitude smaller than the average 
VO, and (ii) the computational burden at the SP, where SAE 
achieves reductions up to 39% of the total processing time. 
The above enable the client to experience a lower response 
time (i.e., interval between query transmission and result 
verification). Finally, our experiments show that the TE in 
SAE consumes negligible resources in comparison to the SP.  
V. CONCLUSION 
We propose SAE, a novel outsourcing model that separates 
authentication from query execution. SAE minimizes the 
participation of the DO in the authentication process, and 
eliminates the need of specialized infrastructure on behalf of 
the SP. Furthermore, it outperforms the conventional model 
on all metrics, achieving significant gains for the 
communication cost and processing effort at the SP, which 
constitute the most important factors.  
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